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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 05-4713

XIU FEI WANG,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(No. A78-387-915)
Immigration Judge: Hon. Eugene Pugliese

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 8, 2007
Before: SLOVITER and AMBRO, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK,* District Judge

OPINION

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge
*

Hon. Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge, United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
designation.

Xiu Fei Wang petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Wang’s
application for asylum under section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), and withholding of removal under § 241(b)(3) of the INA, 8
U.S.C. § 1232(b)(3). We will deny the petition.
I.
Wang, a 14-year-old female, who is a native and citizen of the People’s Republic
of China, entered the United States on October 12, 2002 without entry documents. The
Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Wang by issuing
a Notice to Appear, dated March 19, 2003. At a hearing on September 18, 2003 before
the IJ, Wang admitted the allegations and conceded the charge – as such, the basis for her
removability was established.
Wang filed a Form I-589, “Application for Asylum and for Withholding of
Removal” with the IJ within a year of her entry to the United States. Wang’s claim rests
on two grounds: first, that she has an imputed political asylum claim arising out of her
mother’s forcible sterilization while pregnant with Wang; second, that she has a political
asylum claim based on past persecution to her family because of her parents’ violation of
China’s one-child policy and a well-founded fear of future persecution on the same basis.
According to Wang1, after the birth of her oldest sister in 1986, Wang’s mother hid
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Wang concedes that most of the alleged persecution that
occurred to her happened before or shortly after she was born.
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from the authorities and avoided sterilization at the urging of Wang’s grandmother, who
wanted a grandson. In 1988, Wang’s mother became pregnant a second time and was
able to keep the pregnancy secret. Wang stated that her mother did not go to the hospital
at the time, “because the doctors would have arranged for sterilization at the same time,”
and Wang’s grandmother continued to pressure Wang’s mother to have a male child.
App. at 49. Following the birth of Wang’s second sister, the county authorities received
notice of the birth of the second child and required that Wang’s parents pay a fine in the
amount of approximately $968 for violating China’s one-child policy. Wang’s mother
nevertheless refused to be sterilized and went to live in a relative’s house to escape
sterilization. Wang stated that in retaliation for the fact that the county officers could not
locate her mother, they confiscated items of the family’s personal property, smashed
doors and windows, and destroyed furniture.
Wang’s mother became pregnant with Wang in 1989. Wang believes that while
her mother was pregnant, Chinese authorities sought her out in order to “abort the
pregnancy and sterilize her.” Id. Unable to find Wang’s mother, the authorities arrested
Wang’s grandmother and imprisoned her. Wang’s parents then reported to the authorities
in order to secure the release of Wang’s grandmother. According to Wang, her mother
was then sterilized during the sixth month of the pregnancy while Wang was in the
womb.2 Nonetheless, Wang was carried to term and she has alleged no injury physically
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Wang submitted the declaration of a medical doctor in New
York averring that an abdominal scar that he examined on Wang’s
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or otherwise arising from this incident. Not only was Wang’s mother sterilized, but she
was also fined approximately $1,937 for violation of the one-child policy.
Wang stated that her parents sought to emigrate to the United States in 1994
because they were under severe financial stress due to the hardships applied by the
authorities. Wang’s mother’s asylum claim was denied on July 22, 2002.
Wang and her two sisters remained in China with her grandmother, who Wang
stated was difficult to live with because she resented the girls and wanted a grandson.
Wang stated that the authorities required her parents to pay double tuition as a penalty for
their violation of the one-child policy. Wang’s parents eventually paid to have all three
daughters smuggled into the United States; only Wang was apprehended. Wang alleged
that if she were forced to return to China she would face future persecution based on her
family’s violation of China’s one-child policy and her speaking out against the policy.
Further, she stated that she feared economic persecution in the form of greatly increased
tuition fees.
After an evidentiary hearing, the IJ denied Wang’s applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”),3

mother was “consistent with a mini-laparotomy done for
sterilization,” and that the “scar’s length and location are specific
and unique for sterilization done in the second trimester.” App. at
106.
3

Wang has waived her claim under the CAT by failing to
raise the issue in her brief. See Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215,
221 (3d Cir. 2004).
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on May 27, 2004. The IJ held that Wang failed to “establish any legal principle under
which the respondent would herself be eligible for asylum.” App. at 14. The BIA
affirmed without opinion the IJ’s decision. Wang timely filed this petition for review.
II.
Where the BIA summarily affirms the decision of the IJ, we review the decision of
the IJ. See Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 245 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc); Abdulai v.
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001). In deciding whether an applicant
qualifies for asylum or withholding of removal, this court reviews the IJ’s factual
determination under the substantial evidence standard. Shardar v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d
318, 323 (3d Cir. 2004); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 2001). Under
this standard, the IJ’s finding must be upheld unless “the evidence not only supports” a
contrary conclusion, “but compels it.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1
(1992); see also Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1060 (3d Cir. 1997).
To qualify as a “refugee” who may receive asylum, an alien must establish that she
is unable or unwilling to return to her country of nationality “because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
To establish “past persecution” and entitlement to asylum, an applicant must show:
(1) an incident, or incidents, that constituted persecution; (2) that occurred on account of
one of the statutorily protected grounds; and (3) were committed by the government or
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forces the government is either unable or unwilling to control. Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378
F.3d 314, 323 (3d Cir. 2004). An asylum “applicant can demonstrate that she has a wellfounded fear of future persecution by showing that she has a genuine fear, and that a
reasonable person in her circumstances would fear persecution if returned to her native
country.” Gao, 299 F.3d at 272. Lastly, the threshold for establishing eligibility for
withholding of removal is even higher than that for establishing entitlement to asylum and
requires the petitioner to demonstrate a “clear probability” that, upon deportation to the
country of origin, “her life or freedom would be threatened on account of one of the
statutorily enumerated factors.” Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 1998).
The definition of persecution, as stated by this court and the BIA, includes “threats
to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a
threat to life or freedom.” Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993); see also
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985). Therefore, “persecution does
not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or
unconstitutional.” Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.
Congress has provided that “a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or
to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to
undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control
program” is “deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(B). “Similarly, a person who has a well-founded fear that he will be
subject to such procedures or will be subject to persecution for resisting such procedures
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is ‘deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.’”
Wang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(B)).
This court, in combination with the BIA, has established a clear set of principles
for purposes of interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B). In Wang, 405 F.3d at 143, we
denied the petition for review filed by a child whose parents violated China’s one-child
policy when his sister was born three years after his birth. His parents were fined 20,000
yuan, a sum equal to 100 times the family’s lowest estimated monthly salary. Id. at 136.
The family fled the village but later received permission to pay the fine on an installment
basis. Id. “Nevertheless, the government repeatedly subjected the Wang family
household to property destruction and harassment because the fine remained unpaid.” Id.
In 1996, the government forcibly sterilized petitioner’s mother and completely destroyed
the family home. Id. at 140. Notwithstanding the horrors visited upon petitioner’s
family, we found that “the authorities’ intrusions into the family’s life had their
limitations as neither [petitioner] nor his sister had any trouble attending school, and the
authorities never arrested, detained or fined [him]. Accordingly, it is clear that the
authorities did not direct the actions at [him].” Id. at 136.
Wang sought to sustain his claim for relief by relying on the BIA’s decision in In
re C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (B.I.A. 1997), that the applicant husband could
establish eligibility for asylum by virtue of his wife’s forced sterilization. In Wang, we
distinguished the BIA’s holding in C-Y-Z, holding that “a child . . . is not a spouse.” 450
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F. 3d at 143. We stated, “whereas a husband has a direct interest in whether his wife can
have additional children, a child is in a very different position as the family planning
policies as applied to his parents can affect him only as a potential sibling and not as a
parent.” Id. We reasoned that inasmuch as we had previously held in Chen v. Ashcroft,
381 F.3d at 225-27 that “the BIA’s interpretation of INA § 101(a)(42)(B) not to reach
unmarried partners was reasonable,” the decision in Wang to deny a potential sibling
asylum was more than justifiable, as “his interest in the birth of a child to his parents is
more remote than that of a parent, married or not.” Wang, 405 F.3d at 143. It is clear
then that although a spouse can prove persecution on the basis of political opinion, a child
cannot.
Wang argues that her situation differs from that of the applicant in Wang because
she was in her mother’s womb when the forcible sterilization occurred. The IJ was not
persuaded: “The Court does not believe that the principle announced by the Board in
Matter of C-Y-Z should be extended to other members of the family. . . . [Asylum] is not
a derivative type of benefit in a sense that the persecution of a family member is the
persecution of the applicant, who happens to be related to that family member.” App. at
12. The IJ stated that C-Y-Z merely stands for the proposition that because husband and
wife are both part of the procreative process, “if either of those partners is deprived of the
opportunity to procreate obviously it substantially impacts on the other partner’s ability to
have children.” App. at 13.
We agree. The fact that Wang was in utero at the time of her mother’s forcible
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sterilization, standing alone, is not enough for Wang to surmount this court’s holding in
Wang that children are not entitled to relief merely on the basis of persecution to their
parents for the latter’s violation of the one-child policy. The facts of this case are
indistinguishable from those in Wang. As we stated in Wang, “for the child to be
persecuted he must show that the persecution threatened his “life or freedom[.]” 405 F.3d
at 144. Wang has made no showing that she was physically or emotionally affected by
her mother’s forcible sterilization while she was in utero. Therefore, Wang cannot prove
persecution on account of political opinion, nor can she prove persecution on any of the
other statutorily enumerated bases. The economic persecution suffered by her family,
while deplorable, did not rise to the level of that even in Wang. Accordingly, we will
deny the petition for review.
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